We study Nash equilibria for inventory-averse high-frequency traders (HFTs), who trade to exploit information about future price changes. For discrete trading rounds, the HFTs' optimal trading strategies and their equilibrium price impact are described by a system of nonlinear equations; explicit solutions obtain around the continuous-time limit. Unlike in the risk-neutral case, the optimal inventories become mean-reverting and vanish as the number of trading rounds becomes large. In contrast, the HFTs' risk-adjusted profits and the equilibrium price impact converge to their risk-neutral counterparts. Compared to a social-planner solution for cooperative HFTs, Nash competition leads to excess trading, so that marginal transaction taxes in fact decrease market liquidity.
Introduction
Information, inventories, and competition are crucial elements of high-frequency trading. Indeed, many high-frequency strategies are based on gaining access to proprietary information and exploiting it before it becomes public knowledge. A typical example is "latency arbitrage", where high-frequency traders act based on price changes on other exchanges before these are incorporated into the consolidated "national best bid-offer (NBBO) price".
These strategies are not based on any longer-term view on the market. Accordingly, the main associated risk is the inventory that is built up along the way, which exposes the trader to adverse price moves. Thus, the natural tradeoff in this context is to exploit the available information as much as possible while simultaneously controlling the associated inventories. Crucially, HFTs do not make these decisions in isolation but in an environment where several competitors try to implement very similar strategies.
In this paper, we study an equilibrium model with asymmetric information in the spirit of [5, 1] that allows us to analyze the interplay of these features in a tractable manner. We consider a market where risk-neutral, competitive dealers clear the orders of exogenous noise traders as well as several strategic HFTs. As in the latency-arbitrage trades mentioned above, these have access to future asset value changes one period before they become public knowledge. They in turn trade in Nash competition to exploit this additional information and are penalized by a quadratic inventory cost as in [6, 8, 7] .
Since our model is based on a discrete informational advantage, we start from the equilibrium in a discrete-time setting and then study its convergence as the trading frequency increases to the continuous-time limit. 1 In order to make the discrete-time model stationary, we postpone the terminal time indefinitely and show that a linear equilibrium exists for sufficiently frequent (but discrete) trading. Here, "linear" means that the dealers break even by adjusting the publicly known part of the asset value linearly for the net order flow (as in risk-neutral versions of the model, cf. [5, 1] and many more recent studies) and for the positions accumulated by the HFTs. Since these are not observable in practice, the dealer uses a linear forecast based on market observables. To obtain a consistent equilibrium, we in turn require that the HFTs have no incentive to deviate from the dealers' predictions. The HFTs' optimal strategies then also turn out to be linear in their positions as well as in their signals about future price changes. A key tractability feature of our equilibrium is that for an individual HFT's optimization problem given the equilibrium pricing rule, the other HFTs' predicted inventories are irrelevant; cf. Remark 4.5.
Our equilibrium is determined by a system of nonlinear algebraic equations. As the discretization parameter tends to zero, all relevant quantities admit asymptotic expansions around their continuous-time limit. Irrespective of the HFTs' inventory aversion, several aspects of this limit correspond to the risk-neutral version of the model studied by [1] . Indeed, market depth, the HFTs' exploitation of future signals, and their optimal performance all converge to their risk-neutral counterparts. In contrast, the corresponding inventories are reduced to zero as the trading frequency increases. Highly frequent inventory management thereby allows the HFTs to achieve almost the same performance as without risk penalties.
The impact of inventory aversion on market liquidity and welfare becomes visible at the nextto-leading order in our expansions. However, we illustrate through numerical examples that the magnitude of these welfare and liquidity effects is small on the very short time scales relevant for high-frequency trading. In contrast, Nash competition between several HFTs plays a crucial role in our equilibrium like in the risk-neutral equilibrium in [1] . Indeed, each HFT only internalizes the negative effects of her price impact on herself but not on others. Therefore, each of them trades too aggressively compared to the efficient allocation that would be achieved by coordinating through a central planner. As a consequence, increased competition between HFTs improves market liquidity.
In contrast, transaction taxes have the opposite effect. Indeed, as first observed in a one-period model with risk-neutral HFTs by [9] , a (quadratic) transaction tax forces the HFTs to scale back their trading, thereby moving them closer to their collusive optimum. As succinctly summarized by [9] , "this causes the transaction tax to have a perverse effect: it reduces market liquidity (and increases the adverse price impact faced by informationless traders), but it also reduces informed trader profits". This is an important mechanism to keep in mind when discussing transaction taxes as a tool to improve market quality by curbing high-frequency trading. To become socially optimal, these negative effects of taxation have to be outweighed by reducing costs for information acquisition [9] or (over-)investment in trading technologies [2] for example. Incorporating such features into the present dynamic equilibrium model is an intriguing but challenging direction for further research.
The present paper builds on the model studied in [7] , extending it in two crucial directions. First, we study imperfect Nash competition between several, possibly heterogeneous HFTs, rather than focusing on a single informed agent. Second, we solve for a full equilibrium, where the execution price allows the dealers to break even in each trading round rather than only on average over the whole trading interval. We show that in the continuous-time limit, most predictions of the model are robust. This provides some justification for the use of simpler pricing rules as in [7] or [8, Section 4.1].
Our work is also closely related to [8] , who studies inventory-averse HFTs in a setting where information is only revealed through trades rather than becoming public knowledge one period later automatically. 2 To deal with the resulting more involved filtering problems, [8] directly works in a model with "infinitesimally short" times between trades and optimizes in several parametric classes of trading strategies. In contrast, we start from a fully discrete model, solve for the corresponding equilibrium, and then study its convergence to a continuous-time limit. 3 With our information structure, linear autoregressive strategies indeed turn out to be optimal. However, whereas HFTs in the model of [8] "no longer speculate on the long term value, but just pass their inventory to slower traders", our model predicts that they initially exploit their trading signals in a very similar manner as their risk-neutral counterparts but quickly unwind their positions after their informational edge has evaporated.
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the basic ingredients of our market with asymmetric information. Subsequently, in Section 3, we set the stage by discussing the benchmark case of a single HFT who monopolizes access to the additional information. (By a change of variables, this can also be interpreted as a collusive equilibrium, where several homogeneous HFTs coordinate by letting a social planner maximize their aggregate welfare.) The full version of our model with imperfect competition between several, possibly inhomogeneous HFTs is in turn studied in Section 4. For better readability, all proofs are delegated to the appendix.
Market
We consider a market for a risky asset. At each time t n = n∆t, ∆t > 0, n = 1, 2, . . . , a new increment ∆S n of its fundamental value is revealed. This can be interpreted as the change of the National Best Bid Offer (NBBO) price aggregated across exchanges. The value increments are independent and identically normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 S ∆t > 0. 4 The risky asset is traded at times t n , n = 1, 2, . . ., by three types of market participants:
(i) Noise traders, who submit an exogenous order of size ∆K n at time t n . These trades are normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 K ∆t > 0 and independent from the 2 The two models therefore lie on the opposite ends of the spectrum of information structures studied by [3] . 3 In particular, the strategies of our HFTs are determined by an optimal tradeoff between expected profits and inventory costs at any trading frequency. In contrast, the inventory cost vanishes in the infinitesimal model of [8] , so that both the optimal weight placed on new signals and the rate of inventory management are determined by maximizing expected profits from trades with slower agents. 4 That is, the continuous-time limit of the fundamental value is a Brownian motion W S with volatility σS.
fundamental value of the risky asset. 5 (ii) High-frequency traders (HFTs), with initial inventory L 0 ∈ R, who already observe the increment ∆S n of the asset value before trading at time t n and utilize it to choose their trade ∆L n at time t n to maximize their discounted expected profits penalized for the corresponding squared inventories.
(iii) Risk-neutral, competitive dealers, who set an execution price P n at time t n at which they can clear the market while achieving zero expected profits conditional on each realization of the net order flow ∆Y n = ∆K n + ∆L n and the past value increments {∆S m , m < n}. This means that the dealers incorporate information about the fundamental value that has already become public knowledge. Conditioning on the current order flow means that prices are volume-dependent, akin to quotes in a limit-order book.
Equilibrium with Monopolistic Insider
We first consider the case of a single HFT, who monopolizes the access to the information about the next-period value increment.
Dealers' Pricing Rule
The dealers' information set just before the n-th trading round consists of the past value increments {∆S m , m < n} and the past and current order flow {∆Y m , m ≤ n}, and we denote the corresponding conditional expectation operator by E n [·]. They quote an execution price P n that allows them to break even on average in each trading round:
We focus on linear pricing rules of the form
We do not assume that the dealers can observe the evolution of the HFT's inventories. Therefore, instead of the actual position, the dealers' pricing rule depends on the inventory prediction process
The execution price P n in turn adjusts the fundamental value S n−1 that has already been revealed linearly for the dealers' prediction M n−1 of the HFT's inventory and for the new order flow ∆Y n . To obtain a consistent equilibrium, we require that the HFT has no incentive to deviate from the dealers' inventory prediction, so that this estimate indeed is accurate, cf. Definition 3.2 below.
Remark 3.1. All four coefficients µ, λ, β, ϕ are expected to be positive in equilibrium:
• The order-flow sensitivity λ is similar to "Kyle's lambda", in that it allows the dealers to charge higher prices if large order flows indicate that the HFT wants to buy to exploit increases in the asset value.
• The inventory sensitivity µ adjusts the execution price for the rebalancing trades the HFT implements to manage her inventory. For instance, a very large inventory makes it attractive for the HFT to sell, so that the same positive order flow is likely to correspond to an even larger value increase that needs to be offset by a higher execution price.
• The signal sensitivity β describes how strongly the HFT is predicted to react to their information about value changes.
• The inventory sensitivity ϕ determines how fast the HFT is predicted to reduce large (positive or negative) inventories.
HFT's Optimization
The HFT has a discount rate ρ∆t ∈ (0, 1) and, as in [8, 7] , a holding cost γ∆t/2 > 0 levied on her squared inventory in the risky asset. (This means that ρ and γ are the discount rate and inventory cost per unit time, respectively.) The HFT's information set just before the n-th trading round consists of the past and current value increments {∆S m , m ≤ n}, and we denote the corresponding conditional expectation by
We want to postpone the terminal time to infinity in order to obtain a tractable stationary optimization problem. To derive such a criterion, we first consider the case of a finite time horizon t N = N ∆t at which the fundamental value S N of the risky asset is fully revealed.
As in [4] , risk-neutral HFTs maximize the expectation of their one-period wealth changes. In the present context with asymmetric information, however, the question is at which prices the HFT's position should be evaluated. Since the market price is based on the dealers' inferior information, we assume that the HFT uses her own, more accurate forecast of the fundamental value to evaluate her position. By the independence of the value increments, the HFT's forecast of the terminal value changes by the new increment ∆S n at each time t n . The respective wealth change ∆S n L n−1 corresponding to the shares already held before trading at time t n in turn has expectation zero.
Suppose that the dealers have chosen a pricing rule (λ, µ, β, ϕ) with corresponding inventory prediction process M . Then, purchasing ∆L n new shares at time t n costs P n ∆L n = (S n−1 + λ∆Y n + µM n−1 )∆L n .
Comparing this to the HFT's valuation S n = S n−1 + ∆S n and taking into account that the noise trades are independent with mean zero, it follows that the expected change of the HFT's wealth due to the new trade is (∆S n − λ∆L n − µM n−1 )∆L n . Now, complement this with the inventory penalty γ∆t 2 (L n−1 + ∆L n ) 2 for trading round n and discount the expected wealth change and inventory penalty at time t n with the simply compounded discount factor (1−ρ∆t) n . Sending the terminal time to infinity, this leads to the following stationary goal functional:
Here,
n ] is bounded in n denotes the set of admissible strategies. We note that ∆M ∈ A by Lemma A.6. Using this, one can show that the expectation in (3.3) is well defined and finite for all ∆L ∈ A.
Definition of Equilibrium
We can now formalize our notion of equilibrium. As already outlined above, the key consistency condition is that the dealers' inventory predictions indeed come true, because the HFT has no incentive to deviate from them:
Definition 3.2. Let (λ, µ, β, ϕ) be a pricing rule with corresponding inventory prediction process M as in (3.2). We say that (λ, µ, β, ϕ) forms a (linear) equilibrium if:
(i) Given the pricing rule (λ, µ, β, ϕ), the dealers' inventory prediction ∆M is an admissible strategy and optimal for the HFT's goal functional (3.3).
(ii) Given that the HFT uses the strategy ∆M , the dealers' conditional expected profits in each trading round are zero:
Existence and Asymptotics
If the trading frequency is sufficiently high, a linear equilibrium exists and is unique in the proposed class. All relevant quantities can be expressed in terms of the solution of a quartic equation. In the high-frequency limit, this leads to closed-form approximations by means of the implicit function theorem. The proof of these results is a special case of the more general Theorem 4.2 below, which is established in Appendix A.
Theorem 3.3.
(i) For sufficiently small ∆t ≥ 0, the quartic equation
has a unique solution β ∈ (0,
]. This solution has the following asymptotics as ∆t ↓ 0:
(ii) Define, for sufficiently small ∆t ≥ 0, 6
Then, for sufficiently small ∆t > 0, the pricing rule (λ, µ, β, ϕ) forms a linear equilibrium. In particular, the strategy
is optimal for the HFT.
6 Note that λβ < 1, so that ϕ is well defined.
(iii) The optimal performance of the HFT at time 0 is
Remark 3.4. The linear equilibrium from Theorem 3.3 is unique for sufficiently small ∆t > 0. We outline the main steps of the argument. Let (λ, µ, β, ϕ) be a linear equilibrium. The dealers' zero profit condition necessitates that λ and µ are related to β and ϕ by (3.5) and (3.7), respectively. Next, one can use either dynamic programming or perturbation arguments to analyze the optimality of the strategy (∆M n ) n≥1 for the HFT, i.e., that the HFT does not have any incentive to deviate from the dealers' prediction. This yields that ϕ is given in terms of λ and β by (3.6) and that β satisfies the quartic equation (3.4) . It thus remains to analyze which solutions to the quartic equation produce an equilibrium.
It turns out that the quartic equation (3.4) has precisely two distinct real roots. The first root lies in (0,
) and leads to the equilibrium of Theorem 3.3. The second root lies in (
implies that the corresponding mean-reversion parameter ϕ is negative. Hence, by Lemma A.6, the corresponding strategy (∆M n ) n≥1 is not admissible. Moreover, this strategy would also not be optimal in any larger admissibility class. Indeed, the performance of the strategy (∆M n ) n≥1 can be computed explicitly in terms of β, ϕ, and λ using the explicit representation for M n from the proof of Lemma A.6. Then, it turns out that for ϕ < 0 and sufficiently small ∆t > 0, the inventory penalty dominates the expected profits and leads to the performance −∞.
Comparative Statics
We now discuss the optimal trading strategy, pricing rule, and optimal HFT performance for the equilibrium of Theorem 3.3. The continuous-time limit ∆t → 0 of the equilibrium coincides with its risk-neutral counterpart [1] ; the effects of inventory aversion only become visible in the leading-order correction terms for ∆t > 0. Indeed, in this limit, the optimal trading strategy ∆L n = σ K σ S ∆S n and the linear pricing rule P n = S n−1 + σ S 2σ K ∆Y n coincide with the risk-neutral equilibrium of [1] . For the rest of this section, we turn to the case of sufficiently small, but positive ∆t > 0, where the impact of the inventory aversion becomes visible. For the numerical illustrations in Figures 1-3 , we use the volatilities σ S = σ K = 1 as in [9] , 7 the inventory aversion parameter γ = 1, which is of the same order of magnitude as the parameter values used in [8] , and the discount rate ρ = 5%; note, however, that as in the continuous-time limits, almost all results are virtually independent of ρ in any case. (The only exception is the optimal performance D, for which both the limit and the leading-order correction are inversely proportional to the discount rate.) Trading strategy. The HFT's equilibrium position (L n ) n≥0 follows an autoregressive process of order one, where the mean-reversion speed is governed by the parameter ϕ and the innovations are given by β times the value increments ∆S n . The mean-reversion component ensures that the HFT's position does not become too large (positive or negative). Note that this inventory management term does not scale with ∆t as for a discretized Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Instead, it scales with √ ∆t so that the half life of the HFT's position converges to zero as the trading frequency increases. This allows the HFT to achieve the same performance as without inventory aversion in the continuous-time limit. Figure 1 displays the equilibrium signal sensitivity β and the mean-reversion rate ϕ/∆t as a function of the discretization parameter ∆t. We see that β is (in relative terms) close to its continuous-time limit even for rather large values of the discretization parameter ∆t. In contrast, the optimal mean-reversion rate is quite sensitive to ∆t and explodes quickly as the trading frequency grows. Nevertheless, the first-order expansion for ϕ in Theorem 3.3 provides an excellent approximation for the optimal mean-reversion rate.
HFT's optimal performance. Unsurprisingly, inventory aversion has a negative effect on the quantity D, which measures the optimal performance the HFT can achieve starting from a zero position and no initial signal. The optimal performance is plotted against the discretization parameter ∆t in Figure 2 . We observe that the inventory effect is clearly visible for intermediate trading frequencies, but quickly dwindles below 1% for trading frequencies higher than 100 times per day. At the time scales corresponding to high frequency trading, the (risk-neutral) continuous-time limit studied directly in [8] is clearly an excellent approximation.
Pricing rule. The equilibrium pricing rule adjusts the already revealed part S n−1 of the asset's fundamental value linearly for the net order flow ∆Y n in trading round n and the HFT's predicted inventory M n−1 (cf. (3.1) ). At the leading-order, the price impact parameter λ is decreasing in the inventory aversion parameter γ: the HFT's inventory management interferes with the optimal exploitation of the informational advantage that is possible in the risk-neutral case. This in turn allows the dealers to break even on average with a smaller price impact parameter. The equilibrium sensitivity µ = λϕ of the execution price with respect to the HFT's predicted inventory is increasing in the inventory aversion parameter γ at the order O( √ ∆t). The reason is that, for a given predicted inventory (say, positive), a larger risk aversion parameter γ implies that the HFT has a stronger incentive to sell. Therefore, the same net order flow is likely to correspond to an even larger buying incentive that needs to be offset by a higher execution price. Finally, observe that µ = λϕ leads to an equilibrium execution price
that is independent of the HFT's predicted inventory. Figure 3 shows the parameters λ and µ describing the equilibrium pricing rule as a function of ∆t. For the sensitivity λ of the pricing rule with respect to the net order flow, we find that the continuous-time limit, its asymptotic expansion up to terms of order ∆t, and the exact solution of the quartic equation from Theorem 3.3 virtually coincide even for trading frequencies as low as once per trading day. This demonstrates that the formula for Kyle's lambda [5] is very robust with respect to the introduction of inventory aversion. In particular, the apparent welfare differences for noise traders in the present model and in the partial equilibrium setting of [7] are negligible in practice. The sensitivity µ of the execution price with respect to the HFT's predicted inventory is nonzero, unlike its continuous time limit, but the first-order expansion from Theorem 3.3 again provides an excellent approximation even for low trading frequencies.
Remark 3.5. Let us compare our results with the model of [7] , who focus on a pricing rule with λ > 0 but µ = 0. Accordingly, in their model, the dealers cannot break even in each trading round, but only over the entire time horizon. Despite these differences, the continuous-time limits of β, λ, and ϕ are the same in both models. This provides some justification for focusing on simple pricing rules that do not depend on the HFTs' positions as in [8, 7] .
At the next-to-leading order, the effect of the dealers' position-dependent pricing rule become visible. Translated into our notation, [7] obtains the following asymptotics:
Both in the partial equilibrium setting of [7] and in the present full equilibrium, dealers can increase market depth (i.e., decrease λ) with an inventory-averse HFT since these have to balance the exploitation of their informational advantage against inventory management. However, the increase in liquidity in our model is asymptotically smaller than in [7] (O(∆t) in (3.5) compared to O( √ ∆t) in [7] ). Accordingly, the expected losses of noise traders in our model are comparatively larger. In this sense, noise traders pay the price for enforcing the dealers' zero profit condition in each trading round rather than just over the entire time horizon.
For the signal sensitivity β and the mean-reversion speed ϕ, the first-order corrections are of the order O( √ ∆t) in both models, but the coefficients of the corresponding correction terms differ. Since the sensitivity to order flow is lower, the HFT exploits her signal about future price changes (slightly) more aggressively than in [7] , in that the β coefficient is reduced less compared to the continuous-time limit. As the position-dependent execution prices are higher when the HFT's position is larger, the HFT can also employ a mean-reversion speed ϕ that is asymptotically larger by a factor of √ 2 in our model compared to [7] .
Equilibrium with Competing Insiders

Nash Competition
We now turn to the case of k > 1 possibly heterogeneous HFTs, who compete to exploit their common information about the next-period value increment. Each HFT i has some initial inventory L i 0 ∈ R, an individual holding cost γ i ∆t/2 > 0 levied on its squared inventory in the risky asset, and an individual discount rate ρ i ∆t ∈ (0, 1).
The dealers now clear the market consisting of the k HFTs and the noise traders. They use a separate inventory prediction process for each HFT: for each i, the process
for some β = (β 1 , . . . , β k ) ∈ R k and ϕ = (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ) ∈ (0, 1] k . Consequently, the dealers' linear pricing rule now is of the form
for some λ ∈ R and µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ k ) ∈ R k . As before, risk-neutral HFTs maximize the expectation of their one-period wealth changes. With several HFTs, the cost of purchasing ∆L i n new shares at time t n for HFT i is
Here, ∆Y n = ∆K n + k j=1 ∆L j n is the net order flow in trading round n. Comparing this execution price to the HFTs' valuation S n and taking into account that the noise trades ∆K n are independent with mean zero, it follows that, given the other HFTs trade ∆L j n , j = i, the expected change of HFT i's wealth due to her new trade ∆L i n is
Now, complement this with the inventory penalty, discount, and send the terminal time to infinity. This in turn leads to the following stationary goal functional for HFT i:
where ∆L j , j = i, are fixed admissible strategies and the optimization runs over ∆L i ∈ A. Our goal is to find an equilibrium in the following sense:
Definition 4.1. Let (λ, µ, β, ϕ) be a pricing rule with corresponding inventory prediction processes M 1 , . . . , M k as in (4.1). We say that (λ, µ, β, ϕ) forms a (linear) equilibrium if:
(i) Given the pricing rule (λ, µ, β, ϕ), the strategies (∆M 1 , . . . , ∆M k ) are admissible and form a Nash equilibrium. That is, each HFT i cannot improve her performance by deviating from the strategy ∆M i while the other HFTs' strategies ∆M j , j = i, remain unchanged.
(ii) Given that the HFTs use the strategies (∆M 1 , . . . , ∆M k ), the dealers' conditional expected profits in each trading round are zero:
where ∆Y n = ∆K n + k j=1 ∆M j n−1 is the net order flow in trading round n.
Existence and Asymptotics
The following result identifies a Nash equilibrium for k competing HFTs through a system of nonlinear equations:
Theorem 4.2 (Equilibrium).
(i) For sufficiently small ∆t ≥ 0, the constrained system
has a unique solution (β Σ , β) = (β Σ , β 1 , . . . , β k ). This solution has the following asymptotics as ∆t ↓ 0:
7)
9)
10)
11)
and set ϕ = (ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ k ) and µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ k ). Then, for sufficiently small ∆t > 0, the pricing rule (λ, µ, β, ϕ) forms a linear equilibrium.
The optimal performance of HFT i in the equilibrium can be computed explicitly in terms of β i , β Σ , and the model parameters: Fix i and suppose that the dealers use the pricing rule (λ, µ, β, ϕ) and that each other HFT j = i uses the strategy ∆M j . Then, for sufficiently small ∆t > 0, the strategy ∆M i is optimal for HFT i and her optimal performance at time 0 is
where
The proofs of Theorem 4.2 and Proposition 4.3 are provided in Appendix A.
Remark 4.4. The equilibrium from Theorem 4.2 has a certain stability property with respect to mispredicted inventories. Indeed, the proof of Proposition 4.3 in Appendix A (in particular, Lemma A.4) shows that HFT i's optimal strategy is given by
If the dealers' initial inventory prediction is correct (M i 0 = L i 0 ), this shows the optimality of ∆L i = ∆M i for HFT i. But even if the dealers' inventory prediction is incorrect, the HFT has an incentive to gradually reduce the distance between her actual inventory and the prediction:
Remark 4.5. In the equilibrium, the goal functional (4.2) of HFT i simplifies considerably. Indeed, by plugging µ j = λϕ j and ∆L
2) for j = i, the inventory prediction processes M j , j = i, drop out of the optimization criterion. Whence, the value function of HFT i only needs to keep track of the value increments and HFT i's own actual inventory L i and inventory prediction M i but not the other HFTs' inventory predictions. This reduces the dimension of the problem from 2 + k to 3.
Comparative Statics
We now discuss the comparative statics of the equilibrium with several competing HFTs.
Continuous-time limit.
As for the monopolistic case covered by Theorem 3.3, the continuoustime limits of all relevant quantities are very good approximations at the fast trading speeds relevant for high-frequency trading. For the dealers' equilibrium pricing rule, (4.9) and (4.11) show convergence towards the risk-neutral model with imperfect competition studied by [1, 9] . Indeed, like for one monopolistic HFT, the sensitivities µ 1 , . . . , µ k of the execution price with respect to the HFTs' positions vanish at rate √ ∆t, whereas the sensitivity λ with respect to the net order flow converges to its risk-neutral counterpart. Likewise, the weight β i that is placed on new trading signals also converges to its risk-neutral counterpart. As in the monopolistic case, the mean-reversion rate ϕ i /∆t diverges as the trading frequency increases. Consequently, the HFT i's performance D i converges to its risk-neutral counterpart, as the inventory penalty disappears in the continuous-time limit.
Nash competition. To understand how the Nash competition between the HFTs impacts the scaling of the continuous-time limits, it is helpful to compare them to the corresponding results that obtain if the HFTs coordinate their actions through a central planner who aims to maximize their aggregate performance. We focus on the continuous-time limit of k homogeneous HFTs that have the same cost and preference parameters γ and ρ and initial inventories. Then, the central planner problem reduces to the case of a monopolistic HFT studied in Section 3, but with γ replaced by γ/k. That is, the "aggregate HFT" accumulates all of the individual inventory tolerances. Since the limiting price impact and trading strategy in Theorem 3.3 are independent of inventory aversion, we observe the typical effects of Nash competition on trading and welfare. Indeed, with imperfect competition, the HFTs overuse their common informational advantage in that their aggregate signal sensitivity is too large: β Σ = k 1/2 σ K /σ S under competition compared to β Σ = σ K /σ S with coordination. As observed by [9] , this is an incarnation of the classical "tragedy of the commons": the HFTs overuse their common good, the liquidity available in the market. Put differently, each of them only internalizes their own price impact cost, but not the negative effect this has for the others. This excess trading volume (with the same informational advantage) drives down the HFTs' aggregate performance by a factor of 2k 1/2 /(1 + k) ∈ (0, 1]. This in turn allows the dealers to break even with a smaller price impact parameter λ; it is reduced by the same factor 2k 1/2 /(1 + k) ∈ (0, 1].
Inventory aversion. Under Nash competition, the first-order correction term of the price impact parameter λ (cf. (4.9)) is of the order O( √ ∆t) and increases with the inventory aversion parameter γ. This is in stark contrast to the monopolistic case where the first-order correction term is of the order O(∆t) and decreasing in γ (cf. (3.5) ). This initially surprising effect is explained by the excessive trading due to Nash competition. Indeed, with inventory aversion, the HFTs scale back their aggregate trades on their signals as described by β Σ in (4.8) . This moves the HFTs closer to their coordinated equilibrium and forces the dealers to recuperate their lost trading profits by increasing λ.
Regarding an HFT's individual performance, increasing inventory aversion has two opposing effects. On the one hand, increasing inventory aversion of course lowers the HFT's performance through the higher inventory penalty. On the other hand, as above, it moves the competitive HFTs closer to their coordinated equilibrium and thereby improves each HFT's individual performance. This counterplay is reflected in the first-order correction term of an HFT's performance D i in (4.12). For example, in the case of homogeneous HFTs, the first-order correction term is negative for k ≤ 2, positive for k ≥ 4, and vanishes for k = 3. Whence, under sufficiently strong competition, inventory aversion has a beneficial effect on the HFTs' performance compared to the corresponding risk-neutral equilibrium. Heterogeneity. While the aggregate signal sensitivity β Σ is always decreasing in the individual HFTs' inventory aversions, the sign of the first-order correction of the individual signal sensitivity β i (cf. (4.7)) of HFT i depends on how her inventory aversion relates to those of the other HFTs. Indeed, if an HFT's inventory costs are sufficiently low compared to the others', then imperfect competition allows to exploit price signals even more aggressively than in the risk-neutral case, thereby also improving the respective performance (cf. (4.12)). For HFTs with comparatively high inventory costs, the situation is reversed.
The effects described above are interesting from a theoretical point of view. However, Figure 4 illustrates that while the impact of inventory aversion is clearly visible at low trading frequencies (e.g., daily), it disappears quickly as ∆t tends to zero. Accordingly, these effects only play a secondary role in a high-frequency context.
Transaction Taxes
Transaction taxes are often mentioned as a possible tool to improve market quality by curbing high-frequency trading. As in the risk-neutral one-period model of [9] , quadratic transaction taxes can also be incorporate into the present framework. 9 This means that HFTs incur an additional transaction cost that is proportional to the squared sizes of their individual trades. The stationary goal functional (4.2) then becomes
for some transaction tax parameter c > 0. In analogy to Theorem 4.2, one can show that an equilibrium pricing rule is identified by the 9 Other specifications such as taxes proportional to the trade size are not tractable because they lead to nonlinear filtering problems. However, we expect the broad conclusions for such models to be similar. solution of (β Σ , β 1 , . . . , β k ) of the constrained system 10
The corresponding price impact parameter λ is depicted in Figure 5 , both for a monopolistic HFT and for two competitors. Our results corroborate the findings of [9] in a one-period model with risk-neutral HFTs. For a monopolistic insider, a small transaction tax increases market liquidity. In contrast, with Nash competition, transaction taxes tend to decrease liquidity. The reason is again the negative externality inherent in the HFTs choices: "without a transaction tax, [. . . ] they end up trading 'too much' in equilibrium, that is, in a dissipative fashion such that their profits decrease in the total number of informed agents in the market, leading to greater market liquidity. A transaction tax causes them to scale back their trading to the extent that, while their profits net of the transaction tax are decreasing in the tax, the profits gross of the transaction tax are increasing in the tax. This causes the transaction tax to have a perverse effect: it reduces market liquidity (and increases the adverse price impact faced by informationless traders), but it also reduces informed trader profits" [9] .
This basic mechanism should be kept in mind when discussing transaction taxes in the context of high-frequency trading. In the modeling framework considered here, market liquidity cannot be improved by taxation but only by encouraging more competition among HFTs, compare Figure 4 .
10 While λ and µi are still given by (4.9) and (4.11), respectively, ϕi is determined by ϕi = 1 − (λ+2c)β i 1−λβ Σ . The upper bound on βi is equivalent to ϕi being nonnegative.
Taxes can, however, become socially preferable if one considers costs for information acquisition [9] or (over-)investment in trading technologies [2] . Incorporating such features into the present model is a challenging but important direction for future research.
A Proofs
In this section, we prove Theorem 4.2 and Proposition 4.3. We start with the existence of a local solution to the system (4.4)-(4.6) for small ∆t.
Lemma A.1. There is ε > 0 such that for all ∆t ∈ [0, ε), the system (4.4)-(4.6) has a unique solution (β Σ , β 1 , . . . , β k ) with the asymptotics (4.7)-(4.8).
Proof. Step 1. We note that for ∆t = 0, the system (4.4)-(4.6) simplifies to
which has the unique solutionβ Σ = k
Step 2. We next show the existence of a solution for small ∆t > 0. First, we transform the system (4.4)-(4.6) to an equivalent system which is amenable to the implicit function theorem. Consider the following reparameterization of the domain (0, ∞) × R 1+k of the variables (∆t, β Σ , β 1 , . . . , β k ):
After inserting this change of variables into (4.4)-(4.6), simplifying, and multiplying the resulting equations by convenient nonzero terms, it follows that for any 0 < ∆t = δ 2 , the original system (4.4)-(4.6) is equivalent to the system
Here, the ( * )-terms stand for generic polynomials in x, y 1 , . . . , y k , which do not depend on δ and are not important for the subsequent calculations.
Second, we show that the transformed system (A.1)-(A.2) has a solution (x(δ), y 1 (δ), . . . , y k (δ)) in a neighborhood of δ = 0. It is readily verified that
is a solution to the quadratic system that arises from (A.1) by inserting δ = 0. Moreover, the Jacobian of (h 0 , h 1 , . . . , h k ) with respect to the variables (x, y 1 , . . . , y k ), evaluated at δ = 0 and
, where a i = 2(x + kȳ i ) < 0 and zero entries are omitted. Using row (or column) transformations, one can verify that this matrix is invertible. Therefore, the implicit function theorem yields an ε > 0 and a continuously differentiable function (x, y 1 , . . . , y k ) : (−ε , ε ) → R 1+k such that (x(δ), y 1 (δ), . . . , y k (δ)) solves (A.1) for all δ ∈ (−ε , ε ) and x(0) =x and y i (0) =ȳ i for i = 1, . . . , k.
Sincex + kȳ i < 0, making ε smaller if necessary, we can also ensure that (x(δ), y 1 (δ), . . . , y k (δ)) satisfies the inequalities (A.2) for all δ ∈ (−ε , ε ). Third, after reverting the change of variables and setting ε := (ε ) 2 , we can conclude that for any ∆t ∈ [0, ε),
defines a solution to the original system (4.4)-(4.6). Moreover, the functions β Σ , β i , i = 1, . . . , k, are continuously differentiable on (0, ε) and continuous on [0, ε) and, in view of the expressions (A.3), have the asymptotic expansions (4.7)-(4.8). 11
Step 3. We finally address the uniqueness of a solution for small ∆t > 0. Denote the right-hand side of (4.5) by g(β Σ , β i , ∆t), i.e.,
First, we show that for any ∆t > 0 and β Σ > 0, there is a unique β i = u i (β Σ , ∆t) satisfying g(β Σ , β i , ∆t) = 0 and 0 < β i β Σ < σ 2 K /σ 2 S . For any ∆t > 0 and β Σ > 0, the discriminant of the quadratic function g(β Σ , ·, ∆t) is positive:
Hence, g(β Σ , ·, ∆t) has two distinct real roots. Since furthermore
the assertion follows from the intermediate value theorem. Next, we argue that for any ∆t > 0 such that ρ i ∆t < 1, the function u i (·, ∆t) is decreasing on (0, ∞). As u i (β Σ , ∆t) is the (smaller) solution of a quadratic equation, we have an explicit formula for u i (β Σ , ∆t). By direct computations and simplifications, one can show that its partial derivative ∂u i ∂β Σ (β Σ , ∆t) is negative for β Σ > 0 and 0 < ρ i ∆t < 1. Finally, fix ∆t > 0 small enough and let (β Σ , β 1 , . . . , β k ) and (β Σ , β 1 , . . . , β k ) be two solutions to (4.4)-(4.6). In particular, β i = u i (β Σ ) and β i = u i (β Σ ) for all i = 1, . . . , k. We may assume without loss of generality that β Σ ≤ β Σ . Then, by the above,
Let ( β, β Σ ) = (β 1 , . . . , β k , β Σ ) be as in Theorem 4.2 (i). We now turn to the second part of Theorem 4.2. We first note that ϕ i = 1 −
shows that ϕ i < 1. The expansions (4.9)-(4.11) follow from the corresponding expansions for β i and β Σ . In particular, the expansion for ϕ i shows that ϕ i > 0 for ∆t > 0 small enough. In view of Lemma A.6, this implies the admissibility of the strategies ∆M i defined in (4.1):
Lemma A.2. For ∆t > 0 small enough, ∆M i ∈ A for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Next, we show that for the pricing rule and strategies defined in Theorem 4.2, the dealers' zero profit condition holds. Lemma A.3. Suppose that the dealers use the pricing rule (λ, µ, β, ϕ) defined in Theorem 4.2 and that each HFT i uses the strategy ∆M i as defined in (4.1). Then the zero profit condition (4.3) holds.
Proof. In view of the definition of ∆M i in (4.1),
where β Σ = k j=1 β j . Since ∆K n and ∆S n are independent normally distributed random variables, the random vector (∆S n , X n ), where
has a bivariate normal distribution. Moreover, X n is observable with respect to the dealers information set at time n. Therefore, by the formula for the conditional marginal mean of a bivariate normal random vector, we find that
The zero profit condition (4.3) now follows from the definitions of λ and µ j in (4.9) and (4.11).
To complete the proof of Theorem 4.2 (ii), we need to show that given the dealers' pricing rule (λ, µ, β, ϕ), the strategies (∆M 1 , . . . , ∆M k ) form a Nash equilibrium for the HFTs. So fix i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and suppose that the dealers use the pricing rule (λ, µ, β, ϕ) and that every other HFT j, j = i, uses the strategy
Plugging these strategies for j = i into the goal functional (4.2) of HFT i and using that µ j = λϕ j by the definition of µ j in (4.11), we see that the inventories of the other HFTs disappear:
To wit, the individual optimization problem of HFT i in our equilibrium of k competitive HFTs reduces to that of a single HFT who is facing the pricing rule (λ, µ i , β i , ϕ i ) and is trading a risky asset whose standard deviation of value increments is changed by a factor of 1 − λ j =i β j . It will be convenient to represent HFT i's strategy ∆L i relative to its prediction ∆M i . We thus consider a new state variable Z i , defined via
that keeps track of the deviation of the actual inventory L i of HFT i from the corresponding prediction M i . It is clearly equivalent to control either ∆L i ∈ A or ∆Z i ∈ A (note that A is a vector space and that ∆M i ∈ A by Lemma A.2), and we need to show that ∆Z i ≡ 0 is optimal. Substituting (A.5) into (A.4) and using again the definitions of ∆M i and µ i yields the following reduced optimization problem: The next lemma provides the value function for (A.6) and shows that the optimal feedback control is of the form ∆Z i = −ζ i Z i for some ζ i ∈ (0, 1). In particular, since M i 0 = L i 0 , we have Z i 0 = 0, so that ∆Z i ≡ 0 is optimal for (A.6). 12 As a consequence, ∆L i = ∆M i is an optimal strategy for HFT i. (ii) For ∆t > 0 sufficiently small, define F i and G i by
, (A.9)
Then, the function where (M, ∆S, Z) ∈ R 3 and X is a standard normal random variable. Moreover, the supremum on the right-hand side is attained at ∆Z = −ζ i Z.
(iii) Define ∆ Z i = (∆Z i n ) n≥1 by Z i 0 = Z i 0 and ∆ Z i n = −ζ i Z i n−1 . Then, ∆ Z i ∈ A is an optimizer for (A.6) and the maximum is given by v(M i 0 , ∆S 1 , Z i 0 ). Proof. To ease the notation, we drop all sub-and superscripts "i" in the proof.
(i): After eliminating ζ, the system reduces to a quadratic equation in E, which turns out to have a unique positive solution.
(ii): First, we show that ∆Z = −ζZ maximizes the supremum on the right-hand side of the DPE (A.11) for our candidate value function v. Using that
the right-hand side of (A.11) simplifies to a concave quadratic function in ∆Z. Solving its first-order condition for ∆Z yields ∆Z = η − β(F + γ∆t + λ) E + γ∆t + 2λ ∆S − (F + γ∆t)(1 − ϕ) − λϕ E + γ∆t + 2λ M − E + γ∆t E + γ∆t + 2λ Z.
Since the Z-coefficient is equal to −ζ, it suffices to show that the other two terms vanish. We show in Lemma A.5 below that F + γ∆t = λϕ/(1 − ϕ). Hence, the M -coefficient vanishes and, moreover, the numerator of the ∆S-coefficient simplifies to η − β( Moreover, ∆M, ∆Z ∈ A implies that ∞ n=1 (1 − ρ∆t) n (1 + M 2 n−1 + (∆S n ) 2 + Z 2 n−1 + (∆Z n ) 2 ) is integrable. This together with the estimates for v and f implies that the second term on the righthand side of (A.12) converges to zero as N → ∞ and that the left-hand side of (A.12) converges to J (M 0 , ∆S 1 , Z 0 ; ∆Z) as N → ∞. In summary, we obtain J (M 0 , ∆S 1 , Z 0 ; ∆Z) ≤ v(M 0 , ∆S 1 , Z 0 ).
Furthermore, this inequality turns into an equality for ∆Z = ∆ Z.
The following identity is used in the proof of Lemma A.4 (ii).
Lemma A.5. In the setting of Lemma A.4, we have F i + γ i ∆t =
Proof. This follows from equation (4.5) via a straightforward, but tedious calculation. We drop the subscripts as in the previous proof. Using successively the definitions of F in (A.9), ϕ in (4.10), and λ in (4.9), one can verify that
where c is a nonzero term that changes from line to line.
Finally, the following lemma shows that the candidate equilibrium strategies are admissible whenever the inventory management parameter ϕ lies in (0, 2). Lemma A.6. Define M = (M n ) n≥0 by ∆M n = β∆S n − ϕM n−1 for some M 0 , β, ϕ ∈ R. Then ∆M ∈ A if and only if ϕ ∈ (0, 2).
Proof. The process M has the explicit representation
(1 − ϕ) j ∆S n−j .
Since the value increments are i.i.d. with mean zero and variance σ 2 S ∆t, it follows that E[M Thus, E[M 2 n ] is bounded in n if and only if ϕ ∈ (0, 2).
